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COLLISION COURSE: COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND
THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT: PARKLANE HosIERY
Co. V SHORE
INTRODUCTION
In Parklant Hosteg, Co. v. Shore,1 the Supreme Court held that a prior
equitable determination can estop a defendant from relitigating issues before
a jury in a subsequent damages action. Leo M. Shore brought a sharehold-
ers' class action in federal district court against Parklane Hosiery Co. (Park-
lane) alleging the defendant had issued a materially misleading proxy
statement in violation of common law and various sections of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Act). Prior to trial, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) instituted a separate lawsuit in federal district court
against Parklane based on similar allegations. While the fact finder in the
private class action was to be a jury, in the SEC action (one seeking an in-
junction based entirely on violations of the Act) it was a judge.
When the private action was still in the pretrial stage, Judge Duffy ren-
dered a declaratory judgment in favor of the SEC, finding the proxy state-
ment materially misleading as alleged.2 Thereafter, in an effort to preclude
Parklane from raising the issue of whether the proxy was materially mislead-
ing, Shore moved for a partial summary judgment 3 asserting offensive collat-
eral estoppel.
4
The district court denied the motion, but the court of appeals reversed. 5
After granting certiorari,6 Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority, af-
firmed the court of appeals and allowed Shore to invoke collateral estoppel.
This comment examines the general conflict between collateral estoppel
and the seventh amendment right to jury trial.
I. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND MUTUALITY
A. The Collateral Estoppel Doctrine
Once an issue essential to the judgment is actually litigated and deter-
mined by a valid and final judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent
1. 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979).
2. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aJ'd, 558 F.2d 1083
(2d Cir. 1977).
3. In addition to proving the proxy statement was materially misleading, Shore, a private
plaintiff, must prove his injury and damages to a jury. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375, 386-90 (1970).
4. Offensive estoppel occurs when the plaintiff attempts to preclude the defendant from
relitigating an issue decided in an earlier action. Defensive use occurs when the defendant
attempts to estop the plaintiff. Some refer to this distinction by the more descriptive
sword/shield dichotomy.
5. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977).
6. 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
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action between the parties7 is generally precluded. When the second action
is based on a different cause of action than the first, a litigant may invoke the
collateral estoppel doctrine to foreclose a party from retrying the identical
issue.
8
Closely related to collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) is res judicata
(claim preclusion). Both doctrines involve the conclusive effect ofjudgments
in subsequent actions.9 Res judicata, however, is limited to a subsequent
action involving the same cause of action as the initial suit. At the same
time, res judicata has a broader scope than collateral estoppel; conclusive
effect is given not only to issues actually litigated, but to all matters which
could have been litigated. 10
B. Mutuality and Its Erosion
The judge-made rule" of mutuality prohibits a stranger (non-party) to
the first action from taking advantage of the judgment. Therefore, only if
the litigant asserting collateral estoppel was a party to and bound by the first
action can he take advantage of the judgment in a subsequent suit. 12 The
rationale of mutuality is that it would be unfair for a stranger to claim the
benefits of a judgment when he cannot be bound by that same judgment.
This unfairness is assumed but not explained.'
3
As the scope of estoppel was narrowed by mutuality, the very purpose of
issue preclusion' 4 frequently became frustrated. For example, an unsuccess-
ful plaintiff in one action could sue an unrelated defendant in yet another
action. With mutuality, the second defendant could not assert either claim
or issue preclusion because he was not a party to the first action. With the
7. For purposes of this comment, the definition of a party will be broadened to include
the privies. For general illustrations of privity relationships, see RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
§ 83-92 (1942).
8. Southern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897); Cromwell v. County
of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876); James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451,
458-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); RESTATMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942);
Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1942).
9. Tait v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 620, 623 (1933); Vestal, Preclusion/ResJudicata
Variables: Parties, 50 IOWA L. REV. 27, 28 (1964). See generally Vestal, Extent of Clain Preclusion,
54 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1968).
10. Runyan v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 141 F.2d 396, 397 (6th Cir. 1944); Irving
Nat'l Bank v. Law, 10 F.2d 721, 724 (2d Cir. 1926).
11. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 320 (1971).
12. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912);
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942) See generally Moore & Currier, Mutuah'ty and Conclu-
siveness ofJudgments, 35 TUL. L. REV. 301 (1961).
13. Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 897 (4th Cir. 1965); 1 FREEMAN, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 428 (5th ed. 1925); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
§ 96, Comment a (1942). For a criticism, see Note, The Mutuality Requirement of Resjudicata in
Virginia, 41 VA. L. REV. 404, 418 (1955).
14. Res judicata has a dual purpose of promoting judicial economy and providing the
private litigant with repose from repetitious litigation. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591,
597 (1948). As an offshoot of claim preclusion, collateral estoppel is grounded upon the desire
"to eliminate the expense, vexation, waste, and possible inconsistent results of duplicatory litiga-
tion." Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 470 (1958); Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and
Jodetr of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457, 1457 n.2 (1968).
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hope of eventually winning, a plaintiff could relitigate the same issue so long
as there is a supply of new defendants.
As rising caseloads have virtually submerged some urban courts, pres-
sures have increased to expand the reach of collateral estoppel and thus pre-
vent the retrial of issues fully tried in a prior suit. 15 Moreover, while the
basis of mutuality is fairness,' 6 if its application would result in an injustice,
courts have not been reluctant to carve out an exception. 7 Consequently,
the focus has shifted away from mutuality"8 and to a case-by-case examina-
tion 19 of whether the party against whom estoppel is being asserted was ac-
corded a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior action.20 And now,
in the wake of Parklane, the doctrine of mutuality appears to be completely
abrogated 21 in the federal courts.
22
II. OFFENSIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: FRAMEWORK FOR APPLICATION
A. The Full-and-Fair-Oppor/unilj Test
The Parklane Court enunciated a two-prong test to be used when the
plaintiff is a stranger to the judgment he seeks to assert as conclusive against
the defendant. First, the plaintiff must be unable to join in the earlier ac-
tion; second, invoking collateral estoppel offensively must not result in an
15. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of I11. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971);
Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 897 (4th Cir. 1965); Vestal, Res Judi-
cata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1724
(1968).
16. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
17. E.g., Tipler v. E. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1971); 1
FREEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 429 (5th ed. 1925) ("mutuality is itself
based upon policy and practical necessity and justice . . . and on the same grounds of policy
and justice there would seem to be no objection to departing from it where the party affected
has been given one adequate opportunity to be heard. ... ) Id. § 1929 at 935-36. For a
description of these exceptions, see Moore & Currier, supra note 12, at 311-29.
18. During the past 45 years, the strict rule of mutuality has been steadily eroded by ex-
panding the boundaries of privity and creating numerous exceptions. Some courts have explic-
itly abandoned it. E.g., B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278
N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967). Unless a court allows offensive estoppel by a stranger, however, one can-
not safely say mutuality has been entirely abrogated in that jurisdiction.
The leading federal case departing from mutuality is Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d
419 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950).
19. "[Tlhe mutuality rule is deservedly dead, and . . . any reservations about the totality
of its demise should rest on particularized inquiry . Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest
Brews, 53 CAL. L. REV. 25, 31 (1965).
20. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329
(1971); Popp v. Eberlein, 409 F.2d 309, 310-11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 909 (1969);
United States v. Webber, 396 F.2d 381, 389-90 (3d Cir. 1968); Graves v. Associated Transp.,
Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 897 (4th Cir. 1965); Zdanok v. Gliden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327
F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267
F. Supp. 298 (D. Md. 1967) ("the philosophical basis for the doctrine of collateral estoppel is
that a party should have a full and fair day in court to be heard on the issue but should not be
able to litigate that issue ad nauseam." Id. at 303-04).
21. Shore, a stranger to the SEC judgment, was allowed to assert offensive estoppel.
22. In non-diversity controversies, "the federal courts will apply their own rule of resjudi-
cata." Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946). In most state courts, however, mutuality is
still required. Comment, Collateral Estoppel: The Changing Role of the Rule of Mutuahty, 41 Mo. L.
REV. 521, 521-22 (1976).
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injustice to the defendant.
2 3
B. Plaintifs Ability to Join
As a general rule, a prior judgment's preclusive effect will be denied a
stranger if he could have effected joinder in the first action against his pres-
ent adversary.2 4 The trouble has been that, contrary to the very design of
estoppel, offensive use by a stranger may actually promote repetitious litiga-
tion. 25 By waiting for other plaintiffs to litigate their actions first, a potential
plaintiff can assert estoppel and reap the fruits of another's victory without
incurring the costs of trial or any consequences of another's defeat.2 6 In rec-
ognition of this, Parklane would have denied Shore the benefits of the SEC
judgment if he "could have easily joined in the earlier action .... *27 This
prerequisite should prod a potential plaintiff into joinder and will tend to
remove any reward for intentionally sitting on the sidelines. Both case 28
and statutory29 law operated to deny Shore of the opportunity to join in the
SEC action.
C. Fairness of Ofensive Estoppel
1. Striking the Proper Balance
In essence, Parklane attempted to reconcile two competing policies: the
desire for judical economy with the corollary of avoiding inconsistent factual
determinations, and the need to ensure practical fairness to the defendant.
30
When concerned with the fairness of issue preclusion, it is important to
note the offensive-defensive distinction.3 1 Offensive estoppel involves a trade
off between judicial economy and fairness to the party against whom the
issue preclusion is being invoked. The Supreme Court is more inclined to
allow a stranger the use of a prior judgment as a shield rather than a
23. 99 S. Ct. at 651.
24. Eg., Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 571-72, 213 A.2d 26, 32 (1965); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) [hereinafter cited as RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) (1975)].
25. See generally Semmel, supra note 14, at 1471-79.
26. Note that when asserted by a stranger, one of collateral estoppel's goals is rendered
irrelevant: a stranger does not need the protection of repose. The only applicable policies are
judicial economy and the prevention of possible inconsistent results.
27. 99 S. Ct. at 651.
28. SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1240 (2d Cir. 1972).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (1976) (a private party can consolidate his action with an SEC
action only if the SEC consents).
30. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328
(1971); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950);
"Such a rule of public policy [collateral estoppel] must be watched in its application lest a blind
adherence to it tend [sic] to defeat the even firmer established policy of giving every litigant a
full and fair day in court." United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607, 614 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 825 (1948). But see Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 199 (1932) ("the mischief which would
follow the establishment of a precedent for so disregarding. . . [res judicata] would be greater
than the benefit which would result from relieving some cases of individual hardship.").
31. See generally Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a
Nonparty, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967).
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sword.3 2 Indeed, defensive estoppel offers the plaintiff a strong incentive to
join all potential defendants as soon as possible, while offensive application
has the opposite effect.3 3 More importantly, courts carefully avoid awarding
issue preclusion to a stranger if it would perpetrate an injustice on the de-
fendant.
3 4
Parklane and the federal courts in general have recognized many factors
as possible justifications for refusing to bind a party to a particular judg-
ment. 35 Given the wide variety of recognized factors and the very nature of
a case-by-case inquiry, the following discussion is not meant as an exhaustive
list of considerations when applying the full-and-fair-opportunity test. In-
deed, the Parklane Court appreciated the futility of attempting to draw in-
flexible boundaries when determining if offensive estoppel would be unjust
to a defendant. The Parklane rule reads: In the trial judge's discretion, offen-
sive estoppel should be disallowed for the reasons discussed in the opinion
"or for other reasons .... "36
2. Appellate Review
The Parklane Court intimated that the unavailability of appellate re-
view may have been fatal to Shore's plea of issue preclusion.3 7 Indeed, it is
clearly unfair if a defendant is precluded by an erroneous factual finding he
is unable to redress through appellate channels.38 Parklane was unsuccessful
in appealing the judgment of the SEC action. 39 It is not surprising Parklane
was unsuccessful in arguing that the court erred in finding that the proxy
statement was materially misleading given the appellate courts' reluctance
to disturb a trial judge's factual findings.40 In addition, the appeals court is
to accord to the SEC all favorable inferences. 4 1 Justice Stewart did ac-
knowledge that Parklane had exercised its right to appeal in the SEC action.
32. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402. U.S. 313, 329-30
(1971).
The leading federal case permitting offensive estoppel was Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee
Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964). The Zdanok court
took pains to articulate the hazards of using estoppel as a sword and then proceeded to demon-
strate those dangers would not manifest. 327 F.2d at 955-56.
33. See accompanying text to notes 25-26 supra.
34. In view of the problems with offensive estoppel, Parklane established some rather de-
tailed safeguards. 99 S. Ct. at 650-51. See also Mackris v. Murray, 397 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1968)
("We should guard against allowing procedural novelties, conceived as shortcut ways of han-
dling litigation, to lead to unjust results." Id. at 81).
35. For a listing of recognized considerations, see Hazard, Res Nova in Resjudtatia, 44 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1036, 1043-44 (1971).
36. 99 S. Ct. at 651. Cf Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 333-34 (1971) ("no one set of facts, no one collection of words or phrases, will provide
an automatic formula for proper rulings on estoppel pleas.").
37. 99 S. Ct. at 652 n.18.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) [herein-
after cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND) (1973)].
39. See note 2 supra.
40. The standard of review for factual findings of a nonjury trial is that they "shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Parklane, the party
attacking the findings, therefore shouldered the heavy burden of attempting to prove the find-
ings are clearly erroneous. Hedger v. Reynolds, 216 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1954).
41. Stacher v. United States, 258 F.2d 112, 116 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 907 (1958).
1979]
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However, the Court did not consider the nature of a defendant's right to
review and its impact on the full-and-fair-opportunity test.
4 2
3. A Defendant's Incentive to Defend
Unlike Shore who had every motive to fully litigate and decided when,
whom, and where to sue, a defendant may lack a motive to thoroughly de-
fend for various reasons.43 Consequently, litigation of an issue generally will
not be precluded by a judgment if the defendant did not have an adequate
incentive to fully and vigorously defend in the initial action.
44
It is generally recognized that the stake in the first suit may be too small
and the trouble and expense too great to justify a vigorous defense. 45 The
unfairness of offensive estoppel is evident where a less than exhaustive de-
fense of a small property damage claim resulted in defendant's liability-
only to have the same judgment later haunt the unsuspecting defendant in a
large personal injury action springing from the same circumstances. 46 The
Court in Parklane concluded that in light of the gravity of the charges levied
by the SEC, Parklane did not lack the incentive to vigorously defend.
4 7
Closely related to the stake a defendant had in the earlier action is the
foreseeability of future suits in which the identical issue would again arise. If
it is unforeseeable (at the time of the first action) that the same issue would
again surface in the context of a second suit, and if as a result the defendant
conducts a perfunctory defense, collateral estoppel should be inoperative. 48
In light of the factor of foreseeability, Parklane noted that not only could
Parklane anticipate a shareholder's action following a successful SEC action,
but that the class action had been filed before the commencement of the
SEC action.
49
As a general guideline for determining whether one defended with the
utmost vigor, it is submitted that it would be useful for courts to ascertain
whether the defendant would have been more diligent if the two separate
actions had been merged into one. An affirmative answer would suggest the
defendant did not receive a complete prior adjudication.
42. In the context of patent litigation, one court did recognize the difficulty of correcting
erroneous findings by judicial review and noted its impact on the "full and fair criteria." Blum-
craft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., Inc., 482 F.2d 542, 548-49 (5th Cir. 1973).
43. Eg., James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 461-62 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) (1973), supra note 38, at § 68.1(e)(iii).
45. Brightheart v. McKay, 420 F.2d 242, 245 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dictum); Evergreens v.
Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944); Fink v. Coates, 323 F.
Supp. 988, 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
46. One could argue that because the defendant could anticipate a future lawsuit coupled
with a plea of issue preclusion, he did indeed have an incentive to defend fully. For a discussion
of the foreseeability factor, see text accompanying note 48 in/fa.
47. 99 S. Ct. at 652.
48. See Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 720 (1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) (1973), supra note 38, at § 68.1(e)(ii).




When a single mishap results in multiple tort actions against a common
tortfeasor, the potential for unfairness to the defendant is readily apparent:
50
If twenty successive actions are filed and the defendant successfully defends
the first fifteen, the defendant cannot use collateral estoppel as a shield
against the remaining five actions.5 However, if the defendant is found lia-
ble in the sixteenth action, can the remaining four plaintiffs successfully
plead the aberrational sixteenth judgment as conclusive against the common
defendant? Like other federal courts,
52 Parklane answered in the negative.
53
The question Parklane left unanswered is: What if in the inconsistent
sixteenth judgment, the defendant was afforded a full and fair opportunity
to litigate, but the jury simply decided the defendant was liable?54 Under
these circumstances, would it be "tenable to afford a litigant more than one
full and fair opportunity forjudicial resolution of the same issue"? 55 In sum,
Parklane asserted it may be unfair if the plaintiff invoking estoppel relies on a
judgment that is inconsistent with previous judgments in favor of the de-
fendant. 56 In the same breath, the Court declared that if the defendant re-
ceived one full and fair opportunity to litigate, the defendant shall be
estopped from relitigating his liability.5 7 If these two propositions are found
in the same action, which one must yield?58
50. See generaly Currie, Mutuaity of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9
STAN. L. REV. 281, 285-89 (1957).
51. Issue preclusion cannot be asserted against a stranger to the judgment. The stranger is
entitled to his day in court. Makariw v. Rinard, 336 F.2d 333, 334 (3d Cir. 1964); RESTATE-
MENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96, Comment j (1942).
52. E.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 540 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327
F.2d 944, 955-56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964). Contra, Maryland v. Capital Air-
lines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298, 304 (D. Md. 1967).
53. 99 S. Ct. at 651.
54. According to one court, an aberrational judgment is not uncommon. The court noted
that when the subject of the action is a factual issue of negligence, it would be "subject to the
varying appraisals of the facts by different juries .... " Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Fa-
mous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964). As a further
source of inconsistent judgments, it may be uneconomical for the defendant to vigorously de-
fend a relatively small claim; however, the potential of issue preclusion lurking in the wings
virtually compels a fullfledged defense, regardless of the amount of damages sought.
The defendant, faced with a relatively small claim, is offered a strong incentive to settle out
of court-thus avoiding the expense of full litigation and the risk of an adverse judgment. Ironi-
cally, the threat of collateral estoppel, not the doctrine itself, serves the policy of judicial econ-
omy.
55. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645, 650 (1979) (quoting Blonder-Tongue
Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971)).
Of course the Court's failure to address this subject can be explained by the absence of any
clearly inconsistent judgment in Parklane similar to the inconsistent sixteenth judgment de-
scribed in the text (although the SEC judgment might have been an aberration had further
litigation of the issue been allowed).
56. 99 S. Ct. at 651.
57. Id. at 652.
58. One commentator argues that a full and fair adjudication would prevail regardless of
any inconsistency. Comment , The Use of Governmentudgment in rivate Anttrust Litizaton." Clayton
Act Section 5(a), Collateral Estoppel, anariuq Thal, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 338, 351-52 (1976).
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III. THE TENSION BETWEEN COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RIGHT TO
JURY TRIAL
A. Defendant's Procedural Opportunities
1. In General
The Parklane Court discussed one last situation where it might be unfair
for a stranger to invoke a prior judgment as conclusive against a defendant.
Namely, where the defendant can avail himself of procedural opportunities
in the present action which were unavailable in the first action and these
opportunities "could readily cause a different result."
59
By way of illustration, the Court noted that issue preclusion may have
been denied had Parklane been forced to defend the SEC action in an incon-
venient forum. 60 A defendant does not receive a full and fair opportunity if,
because of the forum, he is forced to significantly compromise his discovery
or access to witnesses.6 ' The convenience of the earlier forum is especially
relevant with offensive estoppel. Unlike defensive use where the party
against whom the judgment is being asserted could decide where to sue, a
defendant generally is not afforded the luxury of forum choice.
62
The Court, of course, also ruled that to justify denying estoppel, the
procedural opportunity must be sufficient to have an impact on the judg-
ment.6 3 Accordingly, if the location of forum is of little consequence, this
alone should not impede the application of offensive estoppel.
64
The Court conceded Parklane would be entitled to a jury fact finder in
the private action were it not for the SEC action. 65 Thus, there was a proce-
dural opportunity unavailable in the equitable SEC action that was avail-
able in the private action. Specifically, Parklane did not have the right to a
trial by jury in the former but did in the latter. The Court, however, held
that the mode of a trial (judge or jury) is "basically neutral" and it is un-
likely that a jury trial would engender a different judgment. 66 The question
then becomes whether the right to a jury trial is of enough significance that
without it Parklane was not afforded a full and fair prior adjudication.
59. 99 S. Ct. at 651 (footnote omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) (1975), supra
note 24, at § 88(2).
60. 99 S. Ct. at 651 n. 15.
61. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 333
(197 1) (considered choice of forum to determine if patentee had a full and fair oportunity); Fink
v. Coates, 323 F. Supp. 988, 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)(denied estoppel where defendant unsuccess-
fully opposed the forum of the first action and defended against relatively small claim).
62. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) (1975), supra note 24, at § 88, Comment d.
63. 99 S. Ct. at 652.
64. E.g., Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Hogan, 476 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1973).
65. 99 S. Ct. at 652 n.19.
The seventh amendment to the Federal Constitution preserves the right of trial by jury in
suits at common law. Therefore, a party to a common law action (e.g., for damages) has a right
to jury trial. The common law action is in contradistinction to equity, admiralty, and adminis-
trative proceedings where a party generally cannot demand a jury trial. See genera/ly Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
66. 99 S. Ct. at 652 n. 19. Amazingly, the Court neither explains why nor cites any author-
ity for this conclusion.
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2. A Trial's Mode: Is It Neutral?
The impact of jury trials has been written about at length.67 It is be-
yond the scope of this paper to discuss the merits of juries.68 However,
whether one views a jury as too fickle or as fundamental to our system of
justice, the fact remains that a jury fact finder does seem to influence a deci-
sion-either for the better or worse. If the jury mode is truly insignificant,
why would so many commentators devote their energies to this subject?
Why have a Constitutional amendment preserve a right unless that right
could affect the outcome of the trial? Moreover, Justice Stewart's assertion
that juries are "basically neutral" is a departure from the importance the
Supreme Court traditionally has accorded the jury mode.
69
Aside from these troubling questions, Parklane did not reconcile a previ-
ous decision where the Supreme Court ruled that a trial by jury could cause
a different outcome: Speaking for the Court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
70
Justice Frankfurter ruled that in a diversity action when state and federal
procedures clash and the choice of one may determine the outcome of the
case, the federal courts are to apply the state's rules of procedure.
As part of the evolution of Guaranty Trust, Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Coop-
erative, Inc. 71 recognized that a trial's mode could indeed determine a case's
outcome. In Byrd, South Carolina law required the factual issues be decided
before a judge, and federal law allowed the right to a jury-hence, the con-
flict of procedure. Admitting a jury fact finder could substantially affect the
judgment of the trial and therefore state law should govern, 72 Justice Bren-
nen cited "countervailing considerations"' 73 and upheld the right to the jury
mode.
7 4
B. The Seventh Amendment and Its Preservation
When determining whether a litigant is entitled to the seventh amend-
ment right to jury trial, the Court traditionally employs an historical ap-
proach. 75 That is, if a party was entitled to a jury under the common law of
1791 (when the amendment was adopted), then he could similarly demand a
jury trial today.
76
While rarely departing from the historical test when denying a jury
67. E.g., H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 4 n.2 (1966)(bibliography).
68. For such a discussion, see Redish, Sevenih Amendment Right toJug Triatl: A Stud in the
Irraiionaliy ofRaionatl Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 486, 502-08 (1975).
69. E.g., Sioux City & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wa11.)657 (1873)("twelve men
know more of the common affairs of life than does one man .. . they can draw wiser and safer
conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge." Id. at 664.)
70. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
71. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
72. Id. at 537.
73. Namely, federal policies favoring the jury mode and not permitting state statutes to
disrupt the federal judge-jury relationship. Id. at 537-38.
74. Contrary to Parkane, the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments notes that the jury mode
may be "significantly influential in the determination of the issue." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
(1975), supra note 24, at § 88, Comment d.
75. E.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937).
76. See generaly Redish, supra note 68.
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trial, 77 the Supreme Court has not been reluctant to expand the right be-
yond the 1971 common law. 78 This can be explained, in part, by the federal
favoritism towards the jury mode79 and the difficulty experienced with the
historical approach. 0
An historical analysis to determine if Parklane would be entitled to a
jury trial is beyond the scope of this comment. 8 ' However, in addition to a
historical search, Justice Stewart also relied on the recent cases of Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover 8 2 and Kachen v. Land 8 3 to buttress his proposition
that an equitable determination may operate conclusively as to a defendant
in a subsequent legal action and thus deny a jury trial. 84 Justice Stewart's
reading of Beacon is novel and seems to subvert its very thrust.
The plaintiff in Beacon sought equitable relief and the defendant an-
swered with a legal counterclaim. 8 5 The trial judge tried the equitable issues
in the complaint before any jury trial of the counterclaim. After recognizing
that this equitable determination by the judge might preclude a jury trial of
subsequent legal issues,86 Justice Black for the majority in Beacon reversed
and held the seventh amendment cannot be impaired in such a manner.
8 7
Parklane, however, cited an assumption in Beacon of possible effects of collat-
eral estoppel, notwithstanding Beacon's earnest attempt to preserve jury tri-
als. By requiring the resolution of legal claims before a jury first, Beacon
sought to insulate a defendant from estoppel when its application would
deny him of a jury trial of his legal claims. Justice Black went on to declare
that, when there are legal issues involved, only under the most compelling
circumstances can a prior equitable determination deny a litigant a jury
trial. 88
Justice Stewart then cited Katchen as confirming his interpretation of
Beacon and notes that Katchen allowed an equitable determination to estop
77. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372
(1943). The extent of the departure was to matters of form, and the right was preserved as to its
substance.
78. Eg., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Beacon Theatres Inc. v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500 (1959). Beacon represents the leading case in the extension of the seventh amendment
beyond the historical standard. James, Right to atugy Trlin Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 687
(1963).
79. Eg., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). "This Court has long
emphasized the importance of the jury trial." Id. at 510 n.18).
80. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). The Ross Court viewed the historical test as
an "abstruse historical inquiry ... most difficult to apply." Id. at 538 n.10.
81. For an able historical examination, see Note, Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co.: The Seventh
Amendment and Collateral Estoppel, 66 CAL. L. REv. 861 (1978). The Note concludes that con-
trary to the result reached in Parklane, the historical test would disallow estoppel and grant a
jury trial. Id. at 862.
82. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
83. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
84. 99 S. Ct. at 653.
85. It should be noted that Beacon can be distinguished on its facts from Parklane. Parklane
involved not a blending but a separate equitable claim followed by a legal one.
86. 359 U.S. at 504.
87. 359 U.S. at 510 (quoting Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1891)).
88. 359 U.S. at 510-11.
Parklane refused to apply Beacon to separate actions and limited its application to situations
involving a mixture of legal annd equitable claims in one action. Justice Stewart does not
explain why Beacon should not equally apply in Parklane.
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subsequent legal issues without a jury trial. Again, this analysis seems to be
based on a strained reading of Beacon.
The facts of Katchen are arguably within the extraordinary circum-
stances exception enunciated in Beacon. Katchen stressed that to allow a ple-
nary suit with a jury trial in a bankruptcy proceeding-a proceeding which
is designed to be summary in nature-would "dismember a scheme which
Congress has prescribed." 89 Hence, Katchen easily fits the exception to Bea-
con's general principle that a prior equitable judgment cannot deny a liti-
gant a trial by jury.
9
0
Unlike Katchen, Parklane mentions no extraordinary circumstances, no
pressing reason why a jury already impaneled to decide damages could not
also decide if the proxy statement was materially misleading.
A case further questioning Parklane's interpretation of and reliance on
Beacon is Meeker v. Ambassador Oil Co. 9 ' Justice Black's fears in Beacon of es-
toppel operating to deny a jury trial never did materialize---except, of
course, in Parklane. Four years after Beacon, Meeker refused to apply collateral
estoppel when a prior equitable determination would have denied the plain-
tiff a jury trial on his legal claims.
92
C. Unfairness and the Accident ofJoinder
Aside from recent case law, simply employing Parklane's own fairness
test 93 seems to suggest that issue preclusion should not be invoked against
Parklane. First, in Colgrove v. Balltn 94 the Court held that the very design of
a jury trial is to guarantee a fair factual determination.
95
More importantly, however, it seems manifestly unfair that one's invio-
late right to jury trial96 depends (among other things) upon the accident of
joinder. Paradoxically, if Shore could have joined in the SEC action, Park-
lane could have demanded the legal issues be submitted to a jury.97 Park-
lane discovered its inviolate right was reduced to the accident of joinder.
As a result of the application of estoppel in Parklane, a defendant's Con-
stitutional right is now contingent on whether joinder can be effectuated;
89. 382 U.S. at 339.
90. In response to Katchen's demand for a jury trial, the Court said:
In neither Beacon Theatres nor Daty Queen was there involved a specific statutory
scheme contemplating the prompt trial of a disputed claim without the intervention of
a jury. We think Congress intended the trustee's § 5 7g objection to be summarily
determined .... To implement congressional intent, we think it essential to hold that
the bankruptcy court may summarily adjudicate ....
Id. at 339-40.
91. 308 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1962), rev'dper curtaim, 375 U.S. 160 (1963).
92. Citing Beacon in a one-line opinion, the Meeker Court reversed the trial court. 375 U.S.
160.
93. Offensive estoppel should not be allowed when its use would be "unfair to a defend-
ant." 99 S. Ct. at 651-52.
94. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
95. Id. at 157.
96. "The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment . . . shall be pre-
served to the parties inviolate." FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
97. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n.Il (1974); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369
U.S. 469, 479 (1962).
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whether the equitable decree is rendered while the legal action is still in its
pretrial stage; and whether the government even decides to file a complaint.
By seeking an injunction, the SEC now can divest a defendant of the jury
mode. Ignoring the seventh amendment aspects, how equitable is it that
Parklane's right to a jury hinges on these fortuitous circumstances?
CONCLUSION
Park/ane represents the demise of mutuality in the federal courts, a
framework of considerations when applying the full-and-fair-opportunity
test in the context of offensive estoppel, and a conflict between the common
law doctrine of collateral estoppel and the Constitutional right to trial by
jury. The Court's decision will be praised by those who denounce juries or
those who seek to expedite litigation. Parklane, however, should be viewed
with concern by those who recognize the serious erosion of the seventh
amendment for minimal savings of judicial resources.
A stranger's ability to assert collateral estoppel should depend on the
extent he furthers estoppel's policy goals. With Shore invoking estoppel as a
sword, only two policies are served: preventing a jury from reaching a deter-
mination inconsistent with the SEC judgment, and avoiding the delay of
relitigating Parklane's liability. Without the policy of repose from repeti-
tious litigation applicable, Shore represents, in effect, society's interests at
large.
Symmetry of factual findings should not stand in the way of fairness to
Parklane, and the amount of judicial energy conserved here would be mini-
mal.98 In any event-and especially when juxtaposed against the insignifi-
cant judicial economies achieved--collateral estoppel should be disallowed
when it so derogates the seventh amendment.
First, Parklane was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issue of its liability in the SEC action. The jury mode is significant, Parklane
notwithstanding. The Court's decision relegates the seventh amendment to
a level of importance subordinate to an inconvenient forum.
Second, recent Court decisions, Beacon in particular, do not support the
result reached in Parklane and, in fact, would argue to preserve the right to
trial by jury. There were no imperative circumstances present to justify de-
nying Parklane the right to a jury trial.
Finally, there is the inherent unfairness of granting one defendant the
jury mode if the legal and equitable claims happen to be present in the same
action and denying Parklane a trial by jury because the equitable claim is
followed by, and separate from, the legal claim.
Parklane does not represent the high mark of judicial respect for the sev-
enth amendment or its preservation.
Steve M. Skoumal
98. Note, supra note 81, at 870-73.
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